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Marx, like Hegel, denied that a rational order exists in the physical
world and that human beings possess reason. However, he stood Hegel's
philosophy on its head. Instead of the order of the physical and social
worlds emerging from a transcendental ego, Marx believed that the mate-
rial world is primary, and human consciousness emerges from experience.
Most importantly, human consciousness emerges from the experience of
producing the material means of existence.
The engine of social change, according to Marx, is class struggle. In a
perfect world, all would freely choose when and how to participate in the
cooperative effort to produce the material means of existence. Such a uto-
pian society would be wholly voluntary and without conflicting interests;
this is what he meant by "communism." However, according to Marx,
throughout history some have compelled others to work in ways they have
not freely chosen, and some are so compelled. These classes constitute the
two elements of the class struggle. When an oppressed class becomes suffi-
ciently conscious of its oppression and of the need for revolution, it at-
tempts to overthrow the ruling class. If the revolution succeeds, the
winners reconstitute society in accordance with their own interests. If their
interests do not overlap sufficiently with the interests of the whole people,
the class struggle is renewed.
The class struggle and periodic revolutions constitute "dialectical mate-
rialism, " Marx's account of the "objective laws of social development."
Only those whose consciousness reflects the objective laws of social develop-
ment correctly understand human events and act responsibly in human
affairs. Marx's successors, especially Lenin, decreed that only members of
the Communist Party have a consciousness that correctly mirrors the objec-
tive laws of social development. Therefore, only Party members should
make decisions that significantly affect human survival and welfare. This
explains the monopoly on decision making that the Communist Party en-
joys, and zealously protects, in the Soviet Union. But the doctrine that only
Communist Party members have true consciousness has extremely impor-
tant implications for international discourse.
The Soviet government is organized so that the 'false consciousness" of
non-party members cannot direct and control any significant actions. Be-
cause of the 'false consciousness" of the masses, the Party cannot reason
with them. Therefore, all non-members of the Party must be deceived and
manipulated for their own good. Of course, non-Communists in foreign
lands are assumed to have 'false consciousnesses. " Therefore, members of
the Soviet Communist Party and those under their control do not commu-
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nicate in good faith with such persons. An outsider seeking to understand
law in a Communist country must look beyond what Communists say it is,
to what it does in practice. Professor Sundberg, Director of Studies, Insti-
tute of Public and International Law, Stockholm, discusses what that
practice is.
ON MARXISM AS A LEGAL PRACTICE
JACOB W. F. SUNDBERG*
Introductory Note
Participating in a number of international conferences during the
1970s and 1980s, I have always been disturbed by how easily intelligent
and articulate Communists, usually from Cuba or the German Demo-
cratic Republic, have succeeded in controlling their audiences. In con-
trast, very distinguished, American delegates, often members of the high
judiciary, have observed this phenomenon helplessly, uttering respectable
yet totally irrelevant legal observations. Many of our Western colleagues
do not take the Communists seriously. They believe that they are merely
facing a facade that a few observations by a few sincere and honorable
individuals can explode.
I know that Gray Dorsey has been as disturbed as I by a certain lack
of insight among Western lawyers into the thinking of Marxist lawyers in
general and Communist lawyers in particular. In this contribution to his
Festschrift, I have attempted to patch together a picture for Western law-
yers that depicts what the Marxist message in law really means. This
picture is based on typical statements made by our various Communist
colleagues and their predecessors regarding what has taken place, legally
speaking, in their environments.
Patching the picture together in this manner requires drawing largely
upon second hand sources. My defense for doing so is two-fold; first, the
amount of literature is enormous-after all over a billion people on this
globe today proclaim their adherence to the Marxist faith. Second, the
impact on the contemporary world of these teachings has resulted from
innumerous secondary interpretations of the original sources. Rather
* Faculty of Law, University of Stockholm, Stockholm, Sweden.
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than getting lost in a morass of detail, generalization will make the dis-
cussion intelligible. So this is a sketch, omitting most of what has been
produced for the benefit of the billion or so people in Communist coun-
tries. This sketch, however, preserves the essence of the message, making
it relevant to Western lawyers' normal way of thinking. In this manner I
hope to contribute something that Gray Dorsey will find useful and
stimulating.
I. INTRODUCTION
Marxist legal teaching is hard put to find much basis in what Marx
and Lenin wrote. Much confusion arises because they did not construct
a theory of law. Indeed, they did not develop a concept (theoretical defi-
nition) of Law. Both Marx and Lenin voiced numerous viewpoints that,
with some luck, may be puzzled together to result in some kind of im-
plicit legal theory. Neither, however, ever produced a major work on the
matter united by theory. The best one can do is to wring something out
of the meaning of one or two statements taken from their day-to-day
polemics, mostly of an ephemeral nature. The level of intent is easily
overvalued. Those writings are obscure, full of contradictory and doubt-
ful passages. Certainly, they may be read in different ways. Clarity does
not always prevail.
Treating the basic texts of Marxism as holy scripture is therefore not
the most productive method of handling them. To me it seems better to
concentrate on some of the main features of Marxism that are capable of
influencing decisively what Marxism means when it is put into operation
as a legal practice.
Even if one is prepared to accept the possibility of a revolutionary mu-
tation of the strange, specifically Marxist kind, certainly one is entitled to
an advance look into the society to which the supposedly inevitable
Revolution should lead. How will this society look after the ultimate
victory of Socialism? Late-Marxists seem strangely disinterested in dis-
cussing more closely the alternative society into which the Revolution
shall lead. Apart from general phrases they disclose very little. It is
therefore interesting that such homogeneous Marxist societies exist.
Marxism should be studied in such societies, but not as grey theory. In
concrete situations and actual environments where Marxism is practiced
or at least receives homage, the difference between Marxism and non-
Marxism becomes visible. Looking at Marxist societal philosophy con-
[Vol. 65:823
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fronted with the legislative task is especially elucidating. Here, compara-
tive law may demonstrate what bizarre legislative principles result from
this philosophy.
The collection of ideas that underlies every Marxist view of the Law is
indeed rather odd.
II. DARWINISM AND THE FORMATION OF PERIODS
Today many of us have difficulty understanding how enormously revo-
lutionary Darwinism has been to our thinking. When Charles Darwin
proclaimed during the 1850s his thesis of the "survival of the fittest", he
introduced something completely new: nature was not only nature but it
also pursued a purpose. This idea was immanent in the times and was
contagious. People came to think that this purpose existed and that it
could be researched in all types of activity - from the evolution of the
animal species to the interpretation of statutes. Karl Marx cultivated one
sprout of this tree. Just as the evolution of the animal species was bound
to a purpose, so was the evolution of human societies. Societal evolution
was predetermined, foreseeable, and researchable.
Marx was a great admirer of Darwin as a scientist, and he assimilated
Darwin's doctrine of evolution in support of his own theories. In fact,
Marx wanted to dedicate the first volume of Das Kapital to Darwin but
Darwin refused.' In Anti-Dzihring Marx compliments Darwin, inas-
much as Darwin's "Origin of Species" is addressed as a dialectic work.2
Among the Darwinists, Marx's own teaching was given a preferred read-
ing as reflecting a Law of Nature. Karl Kautsky, one of the most influen-
tial Darwinist interpreters around the turn of the century, gives Marxism
such a preferred reading. According to Kautsky, Marx's class struggle
theory increasingly acquires a deterministic stamp and develops into a
kind of inevitable Law of Nature, much like Darwin's "survival of the
fittest."3 The Law of Nature brings progression. Marxism stays with the
cultural optimism of the Enlightenment. The Marxist is "progressive."
In the 18th century, some began studying societal forms hoping that
they could derive from that study general rules about these societal
forms. Montesquieu looked for laws about how government should be
organized so he could determine how the form of government affected
1. BROMANDER, AFTONBLADET, March 11, 1972, at 5.
2. JOHN SOMMERVILLE, THE SOCIAL-SCIENCE METHOD OF MARX AND ENGELS.
3. BROMANDER, AFTONBLADET, March 11, 1972, at 5.
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the people governed, their land, and life. He used the method of compari-
son over time and space.4 Marx also tried to discover through historical
research the laws determining the development of societies. Marx
wanted to explain the ideological phenomena by examining the historical
and societal conditions from which they stemmed and in which they op-
erated. From the middle of the 1840s it is possible to identify a definitive
model of explanation. Marx sees all phenomena as conditioned by the
general progressive societal evolution in conformity with the "law of na-
ture." The objective "law" that determines the total societal develop-
ment is of an economic-materialistic nature: the dialectics of the forces
of production and the conditions of production. This meant the birth of
historic-economic determinism.
Marx enumerates the historical development of the methods of pro-
duction. History advances from clan-society to slave-society to feudal
society to capitalist society and finally to Socialist society. As an end
station one finds Communist society - the Marxist utopia. The ortho-
dox line in the Second International saw this as a unilinear picture. Its
"historical truth" was eventually canonized by Stalin.
The Marxist therefore opines that the advance of history is bound to
laws. History advances from clan-society to slave-society to feudal soci-
ety to capitalist society and finally to Socialist society. Ultimately, as the
end station of world history, Communist society will arise. It is essential
that society's development follow this order and that the march forward
can and should be supported by armed violence - "World Revolution."
The Revolution is as natural for society as Darwin's "survival of the fit-
test" is for the Species. The Revolution brings the dictatorship of the
proletariat.
This determinism provides the Marxist with a very dynamic view of
his world and his times. He finds himself in the world as one would find
himself in a car, travelling between New York and Washington, D.C. As
the car runs at 55 miles per hour, one can sit and chat peacefully in the
car, reading and smoking. It is a perfect bliss. The aggressor is the one
who suddenly brings the car to a standstill, say, by throwing himself at
the brakes. People fly around in the cabin, hurt themselves, and scream.
The culprit is easy to find: it is the one who brought the car to the stand-
still. Similarly, once one knows that history is advancing at great speed,
that its advance is predetermined and foreseeable, those who insist on
4. M. RICHTER, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF MONTESQUIEU, 84 f. etpassim (1977).
[Vol. 65:823
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stopping the advance, leaving things as they are, are the aggressors and
the evil people. Good people are progressive. They want to let history
run its course and perhaps speed it up a bit. They are the peaceful ones.
Marx's own historical schedule was not so unilinear. He found place
for still one more type of society, the Asiatic form of production. During
the 1850s, Marx was struck by an insight into the peculiarity of Asiatic
society with the force of a great discovery.5 John Stuart Mill spoke about
Oriental Society, and Richard Jones about Asiatic Society.6 Customarily
one points to Engels as the one who made the Asiatic interpretation of
India and Russia materialize for Marx. As from 1853, Marx used the
Asiatic model. In a famous 1853 New York Daily Tribune article, Marx
called Russia a semi-Asiatic country. The special features of Asiatic So-
ciety were the enormous capital accumulated by the Oriental despot and
his totally arbitrary government which tended to strangle both commerce
and industry.
This economic world explanation becomes more significant when one
considers its pretensions on exclusivity. The primacy of material life
over the spiritual is a cardinal point. Idealists who say that the world is
governed by ideas are wrong. The law, like the morals, is built on eco-
nomic ground and nothing else. Law is only a part of the superstructure.
When the legal system is characterized as a superstructure that is de-
termined by the basis, i.e. by the conditions of production that make up
the economic structure of society, a Marxist legal theory evidently can
only be a partial theory within the more general Marxist theory. It is not
a notion of Law, but only part of an overriding notion of Power. The
various partial elements are insolubly tied to each other.
III. THE CLASS STRUGGLE
"The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class strug-
gles" is the opening statement in the Communist Manifesto. The idea
recurs time and again in the works of Marx and Engels. Class struggle is
indeed, writes devoted Marxist Arnold Ljungdahl, "the shibboleth sepa-
rating in the deepest sense the bourgeois view of history from the Marxist
one."
7
5. K, WITTFOGEL, ORIENTAL DESPOTISM - A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF TOTAL POWER
372 (1957).
6. Id.
7. A. LJUNGDAHL, MARXISMENS VARLDSBILD, 216 (1947).
19871
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Although the class concept occupies a central place in the structure of
ideas, Marx, surprisingly, never defined the concept. Marx often ex-
pressed his impressions of social classes and their mutual relationships.
When he finally did attempt to systematically analyze the concept, how-
ever, he gave up after only a few pages.
In reality, Marx ignored the whole problem. He wrote as if his class
theory was correct. So if one desires to understand the meaning of
"class," one must try to reconstruct Marx's thinking. He, or at least his
successors, seem to have been possessed with the idea that the legal rela-
tions of men to the means of production so dominated their experiences
and their feelings of identity that Society was split into two antagonistic
classes - the bourgeoisie, which owned them, and the proletariat,
which used them but owned nothing. Thus, a simplistic division exists
between (using Marxist polemist terminology) the exploiters and the ex-
ploited. The contours appear, however, of the strange circle that the
class notion rests on the assumption that antagonism exists, while, in
Marxist ideology, the antagonism apparently results from the class
notion.
At this point, however, the enormous role that Marxists must ascribe
to the legal system becomes evident, because the legal system provides
the method for controlling the means of production. A means of produc-
tion is "controlled" immediately only by the person working with it -
for instance by possession resulting from lease. The means of production
is only indirectly "controlled" by the individual holding title to it. To
consider control as resulting from the latter notion rather than the for-
mer, presupposes some kind of legal hierarchy. This assumption proba-
bly came naturally to Marx, who worked in the shadows of Art. 544 of
Code Napol6 on (reflecting the absolute ownership notion of Roman
law). This hierarchy, however, could hardly be transplanted to half-feu-
dal England where the King was deemed to own all land and the holders
of the land were held to have no more than a right of possession.'
In the Marxist Utopia, this understanding is driven to a point. When
ownership of the means of production has been transferred to the people
the antagonism should cease, having been a concomitant to the conflict
between forces of production and conditions of production. This occurs
when, according to Marx's thinking, a societal order that has done away
8. W. GELDART, ELEMENTS OF ENGLISH LAW, 96 (W. Holdsworth & H. Hanbury rev. 4th
ed. 1948).
[Vol. 65:823
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with classes prevails. Because no antagonism exists in a classless society,
law as the superstructure over the economy will wither away.9
Thus, control of the means of production and the class struggle are
two central elements. They are so central, they force Marx's Asiatic
form of production to be discarded in favor of the unilinear model.10 For
a while, Lenin accepted the term, "the Asiatic form of production." In
1899, he called the conditions in Russia "an Asiatic system." The Asi-
atic form of production, however, became uncomfortable. The more cen-
tral the class notion became in Marxist ideology, the more provocative
the Asiatic form of production became, because under the Asiatic form
no "class" owned the means of production. At times Marx said that the
means of production were owned by the ruler, i.e., the Oriental despot.
At times they were owned by the State. But given the Russian Czar's
absolute power, ownership conditions were of secondary importance to
the despotic character of the empire. At the congress of the Russian
Social Democratic Party in Stockholm in 1906, the course shifted.
Lenin's lecture of 1916, "The State and the Revolution," only referred to
the unilinear model and did not discuss the Asiatic form of production.II
The outcome of the class struggle is predetermined once and for all in
the Darwinistic way. One cannot change the course of history, only
speed it up. Foreseeing the inevitable and expediting its occurrence was
the art of the Statesman, according to Talleyrand. This maxim also ap-
peals to those who have been trapped in the Marxist network of ideas.
The role of the Marxist lawyer in bourgeois society, therefore, can only
be that of the hylotrupes bajulus, which removes unnoticed the timber of
the house until the building collapses.
With those of a Marxist orientation, law becomes essentially an instru-
ment of combat for carrying out the class struggle. Indeed, militarist
forms of speech enjoy much favor among the Marxists. References to
"struggles" and "fronts" are commonplace. Marxists are also of the
opinion that one cannot compromise about Revolution. The bourgeois
class must surrender to the revolutionary proletariat or be liquidated.
The way of teaching is constructed, genocide is required, and as we all
know, is carried out by convinced Marxist regimes that have ascended to
power.
9. D. TARSCHYS, BEYOND THE STATE. THE FUTURE POLITY IN CLASSICAL AND SOVIET
MARXISM (1971).
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IV. IMPERIALISM
In 1916, Lenin put the label of "imperialism" 1 2 upon an epoch in the
development of capitalism. This epoch was characterized by limitless
power struggles that were ultimately resolved through armed conflicts.
The explosion was War. "Is there," asked Lenin, "any other instrument
than war available under capitalism in order to eliminate the discrepancy
between the development of the forces of productivity and the accumula-
tion of capital, on the one side, and the finance capital dividing up colo-
nies and 'spheres of interest,' on the other?"
Whether a more profound motive lay behind this contemplation or
not, it eventually became sacrosanct and was applied in simplified para-
phrase. States that had not passed into the Socialist phase in their prede-
termined evolution were characterized as imperialistic. Even Sweden of
the 1920s, an almost completely disarmed state, was considered an impe-
rialistic state.1 3 The Marxists believed they had shown that all these
states had an immanent tendency towards armed conflict. This ten-
dency, they believed, had nothing to do with the choice of political
government.
A Marxist's built-in perspective of the future governs his thinking.
People having arrived at the higher, Socialist, form of civilization are
under a duty to defend their superior civilization. Consequently, if a So-
cialist power enters a war, it is a defensive war. This conclusion follows
from nature itself. Contrastingly, the other side in the war is always im-
perialistic, and therefore engaged in a war of aggression. 4 Similarly, an
attempt to retain the legal state of affairs in a non-Socialist state becomes
aggression between Marxists. This criticism hits everything that denies
the class character of state, law, and morals. Such theories are
12. Lenin, Der Imperialismus als Hdchstes Stadium des Kapitalismus (1916) in 1 AUSGE-
WAHLTE WERKE, 848 (1946). See generally T. KEMP, THEORIES OP IMPERIALISM (1967).
13. In 1929, the Executive Committee of Komintern decided that Sweden "was an imperialistic
country" and consequently incapable of being "neutral." The story about the efforts of some Swed-
ish Communists to fight this fateful classification is told in K. KIHLBOM, CIRKELN SLUTES - UR
MITT LIVS AVENTYR III, 184, 145 f., 162, 181 (1955).
14. The Marxist teaching on war originates with Lenin. Marx and Engels do not seem to have
developed any systematic analysis of the matter. Lenin taught that "Socialists cannot be against
every war without ceasing to be Socialists" (1 AUSGEW AHLTE WERKE, 465 (1946)). Cf. TRAININ,
HITLERITE RESPONSIBILrrY UNDER CRIMINAL LAW 37 and n. 1 (A. Rothstein trans. 1946). For a
study in depth, see Schroeder, Die Rechtsm dssigkeit des Krieges nach Westlicher und Sowjetscher
Vdlkerrechtsauffasung, in VOLKERRECHT UM OST UND WEST 185 (R. Maurach & B. Meissner ed.
1967).
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reproached for conserving the antagonism that supports the formation of
classes and the class struggle.'5
V. THE MAGIC BORDER
This is the way the theory looks. Obviously the law is subjected to a
veritable mutation depending on which side of the magic border in the
pattern of periods the society in question finds itself. The dialectic rela-
tionship between law and morals differs significantly depending upon
whether one looks at "imperialistic" or "socialistic" conditions. One
must therefore always seek this borderline, preferably by looking for the
class contents of the specific legal order and concrete moral in question.16
If a society has not progressed sufficiently in its development, e.g., a cap-
italistic society, it finds itself faced with the assumption that antagonism
exists between the legal order and the morals of the working people. The
legal order must axiomatically be in conflict with the legal consciousness
of the working people. Between the legal imperatives of the imperialistic
state and the moral imperatives of the working people there must be an-
tagonism! No legal consciousness can exist that is common to both the
supposedly antagonistic classes! Commonality would be against nature.
But if a society has progressed beyond the magic border, it will experi-
ence a politico-moral unity between the state and the people.17
Does this not offend common sense? The magic border builds ulti-
mately on the assumed antagonism, and the antagonism creates the class
which in turn creates the antagonism. Isn't there room for some kind of
realistic test with normal scientific apparatus such as sociological inquir-
ies, political science analysis, etc.?
The Marxist answer is "No." People in societies that have not passed
the magic border are so manipulated that they cannot hold a correct
opinion, neither concerning their own interests nor as to what is right.
Members of a capitalistic system can not take any position as to the de-
fects of this system as rational, well-informed individuals because their
15. Schulz, Zu aktuellen Fragen der Rechtstheorie und des Klassenkarnpfs, 23/70 NEUE JUSTIZ
689-93. Professor Schulz of Sektion Marxismus-Leninismus der Humboldt-Universitit Berlin
(DDR) here reviews an article by F.C. Schroeder (Die neuere Entwicklung der Strafgesetzgebund in
Deutschland, JURISTENZEITUNG 393 (1970)). The transparency that goes with a common language
(German) makes the exchange particularly elucidating when spurred as in this case by comparative
law type surveys.
16. Schulz, supra note 15, at 690.
17. Id. at 690-91.
1987]
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evaluations and information are determined within that very system.
Therefore, such members arrive at erroneous conclusions in relation to
the Marxist perception of their true interests. Their legal consciousness
fares no better.
The class-indifferent description of morals and law contributes substantially
to the denial and the suppression of one's own moral imperatives and one's
own legal consciousness among the West German working class. To de-
scribe (in rational but class-indifferent terms) is a form of manipulation of
the worker's consciousness done in the interest of the ruling monopolistic
bourgeoisie. 18
VI. MARXISM AS LAW IN FORCE
Testimony as to what this all means is available from the Soviet Union.
The Bolshevik Twenties was a golden period. Having destroyed their en-
emies by fire and sword, the Marxist revolutionaries started to study in
earnest what a Marxist ideology meant when it was applied to practical
legal matters. This study had been a very subordinate interest to Marx
and Lenin. The task fell upon P. Stuchka, the People's Commisar for
Legal Affairs. He may be seen as the precursor to today's Soviet Marx-
ist-Leninist "legal science."19
His was a virgin task. Suddenly the Bolsheviks possessed a country,
an enormous country, of which they were the absolute masters. Sud-
denly the inflated polemical defamatory rhetoric should be reduced to a
practical reality.
The magic border had been passed, the mutation must have occurred.
The conclusion was the principle of discontinuity.2" The Bolshevik con-
ception of the mutation was intensified to the thesis that the Marxist state
was something completely new in history. All bonds with the past were
denied. The Soviet state had no more to do with the old Czarist Russia
than if it had fallen from the moon and by chance landed at the place
where the old Russia was located. This also colored the attitude regard-
ing the law of Czarist Russia. No one in the new state was bound by the
18. Id. at 689.
19. Bruun, Book Review, JURIDISKA F6RENINGENS I FINLAND TIDSKRIFr 94 (1979).
20. By not repealing the rights - vested or not - which originated before the Revolution but
simply depriving them of legal protection, the Bolsheviks found under this principle of discontinuity
an elegant solution to all sorts of problems relating to conflict of laws and vested rights. On vested
rights, see eg., Kaeckenbeeck, The Protection of Vested Rights in International Law, BRITSH YEAR-
BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-18 (1936).
[Vol. 65:823
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laws of the Czar and no one was bound by his treaties.2" This attitude
only stopped short at the doorstep of marriage: old marriages were al-
lowed to continue.22 But all existing judicial institutions were dissolved
and replaced by people's courts. No court or authority could entertain
disputes concerning the rights of individuals that had arisen before No-
vember 7, 1917. For them there was no judicial protection.23
However, the mutation failed to occur. People still quarrelled with
one another and disputed all sorts of things. Many realized that a transi-
tion period was necessary and that something had to be created to re-
place the law that had been thrown out.
But a Marxist legal structure requires considerable contributions from
the one who erects it. Room existed for many Marxist law theories. Ten
law faculties and one Communist Academy24 were created. Until 1928,
Marxists taught that Socialism and Law were irreconcilable. In the soci-
ety of transition, however, the necessity to reconcile socialism with some
law, whatever the lease of life for that society, arose. How long? Accord-
ing to official teaching, Lenin originally said 40 years, later 50 years.
"Nowadays [1926] in leading Soviet circles you speak about several gen-
erations' ",.25 After this, the idea that law would wither away dominated.
But in 1936 it was proclaimed that the Soviet Union was a Socialist state
21. Whether the Soviet Union considered itself bound by the Hague Conventions of 1907 on
the laws of War remained as a result unclear until March 7, 1955, when upon a precise question
from the Dutch, the Soviet Union through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that the Union
did consider itself bound by all the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 which [Czarist] Russia had
ratified to the extent that they were not in conflict with the U.N. Charter or were superseded by later
treaties adhered to by the Union.
22. A.E. Rodhe, Rysk dktenskapslagstiftning SVENSK JURRISTIIDNING 75 (1923).
23. In May, 1922, the Soviet government made a decree in the form of a program concerning
rights in matters of private law. The Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executiv Committee (an
FSFSR body) and the council of the People's Commissars were charged with the task to propose
pursuant to this program a Draft Civil Code for the Soviet Republic. It was produced in half a year
and entered into force on January 1, 1923. Art. 2 of the Law enacting the Civil Code read: No court
or other authority of the republic shall take cognizance of disputes of private rights arising out
of relations that originated before November 7, 1917.Compare infra note 41. See also A.
FOGELKLOU, DEN ORATrFARDIGA RATrEN 18 (1978).
Note that until 1918, Russia followed the Julian Calender which differed form the modified Gre-
gorian Calender in the Western world by 13 days. The change was made on February 1, 1918,
which became February 14, 1918. November 7, 1917 is consequently, according to the Julian Calen-
dar, October 25, 1917, and the Bolshevik Revolution is still called the October Revolution.
24. ZETLITCH, SOVIET ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, 51 (1931). On the Communist
Academy, see A. Fogelklou, supra note 3 at 21 and infra note 39.
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without antagonistic classes.26 Later on it was taught that the law's func-
tion is essentially education and that law is here to speed the develop-
ment.27 The law is the motor!
Under such circumstances a number of Marxist theories were to be
mirrored in the Soviet legislation. I will limit myself to three of them:
the dictatorship of the proletariat, the class nature of law, and withering
away of the law.
VIi. THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT
Article 590 in the Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law of 1919
laid down a definition of Law: "Law is an order of social relations,
which corresponds to the interests of the ruling class and which is pro-
tected by its organized power." This definition attributed to Stuchka,28
obviously does not define "law" in any specific way. For example, no
distinction exists between the military and the judicial system. Both turn
out to be nonextricable elements in the same order of power.
The practical meaning of this "law," however, is determined by the
dictatorship of the proletariat. Lenin explained what this dictatorship
meant in "The Proletariat Revolution and Kautsky the Renegade":
"Dictatorship signifies, notice once and for all, gentlemen, unlimited
power, which rests upon force and not upon law."' 29 The dictatorship
found its instrument in the general clauses. The people's courts were to
take guidance from government decrees and from their own "socialist
consciousness." Art. 1 in the Civil Code of 1922 provided the connection:
"The civil rights are protected by the law except for the cases in which
they are exercised in a way that contravenes their social or economic
purpose."30 The meaning of "social consciousness" and the "social and
economic purpose" could at any given moment be determined by the
supreme party authorities or by Lenin himself.31 The purpose was to
level the road for the dictatorship and to open up the possibility of mak-
26. The point is discussed in I. LAPENNA, STATE AND LAW: SOVIET AND YUGOSLAV THE-
ORy 37 (1964).
27. Fogelklou, supra note 24 at 26.
28. Id. at 16 & 44 n. 8.
29. I. LAPENNA, SOVIET PENAL POLICY 24 (1968).
30. The Soviet General Clauses and their potentials are surveyed in the famous little book by
JUSTUS WHILHELM HEDEMANN, DIE FLucHT IN DIE GENERALKLAUSELN - EINE GEFAHR FOR
RECHT UND TAAT 72 (1933) which otherwise addresses the situation in Germany at the doorstep of
the Nazi era (takeover occurred 1933). As to the Civil Code, see supra note 23.
31. LAPENNA, supra note 29 at 47.
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ing illusory all legal provisions that stood as obstacles. This served as the
model for the infamous German general clause in Art. 2 of the Reich-
strafgesetzbuch as amended by the Nazi novella of 1935.32
VIII. THE CLASS CHARACTER OF THE LAW
The new Criminal Code of the Russian Soviet Republic, that came into
force in 1922, was intended to "establish solid bases for the revolutionary
consciousness., 3 3 In 1924, Fundamental Principles of Criminal Legisla-
tion of the USSR followed, and on that basis the Criminal Code of 1926
was enacted. Art. 1 of the Soviet code stated that the task of the criminal
legislation was to protect "the socialist state of workers and peasants"
from "socially dangerous acts." Art. 6 defined a socially dangerous act
as an action or omission directed against the Soviet system or violating
the legal order established by the worker-peasant authority for the period
of transition to communist organization.3 4
We are here dealing with what has been called the material definition
of crime. This was, it was emphasized, "a real Marxist, materialistic defi-
nition of crime that showed its true class character."35 The substance of
this concept is that the action or omission that the criminal law formally
forbids does not constitute a criminal offense. Rather a criminal offense
is every "socially dangerous" act or omission directed against the Soviet
state, its economic, social, or political system.36
Using the material definition of crime meant that the vague descrip-
tions of specific crimes in the special part of the criminal law were of
little importance. Aside from the material definition, an analogy was
prescribed. It was maintained -justly so according to Lapenna - that
the special part of the Criminal Code simply became a listing of examples
of crime.37
The material definition of crime prevailed until 1958, at which time it
could be said:
[I]n Soviet practice the material definition of crime has been transformed
from the very beginning into the converse of what it was claimed to be in
32. Cf. Hamburger, L'Analogie Dans le Droit P nal Allemand REVUE DE SCIENCE
CRIMINELLE ET DE DRorr P NAL COMPARt 182-94 (1937).
33. Stjernberg, supra note 25, at 210, 218-19 and n. 1.
34. LAPENNA, supra note 29, at 32.
35. Id. at 38 (referring to A.A. Piontkovsky).
36. Id. at 33.
37. Id. at 34.
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theory: it became a legal device which could be invoked at any time for
justifying any arbitrary action. This principle together with that of the so-
called "socialist legality", in Soviet political conditions meant in fact and in
law a legalization of illegality.38
IX. THE WITHERING AWAY OF THE LAW
The belief that the law would wither away once socialism had been
established called for some kind of tribute. Accordingly, a start occurred
in family law. It was taken for granted that the family should be liber-
ated from state intervention. Furthermore, history should be fulfilled
first in family relations. In marching towards communism it was obvi-
ously logical to deprive family law of as much of its contents as
possible.39
On October 22, 1918, Laws regarding Status, Marriage, Family and
Guardianship were published in the "Collection of Laws and Ordinances
of the Workers' and Farmers' Government." The preface by the chair-
man of the legislative committee explained
that those laws at first glance may not seem to be Socialist in the strict sense
of the word but that they, of course, are proletarian laws which shorten the
road towards socialism. Registration of marriage, this 'legalized forging to-
gether of man and woman', is said to be a form which must, unfortunately,
during the transitory period the duration of which the Proletarian Power
wants energetically to cut short, be employed because a jump right into the
future will mean a standstill and possibly a retrograde step.40
The aversion to marriage increased. The individual was encouraged to
seek the full development of his personality as he saw best. The new
relationship between man and woman was to provide all the blessings of
free love, nobilized by real social equality between man and woman. As
a phenomenon, changing partners was more useful to society than family
stability. The requirements of a general turnover were honored in a kind
of sexual Manchester Liberalism.
In 1926, this philosophy was reduced to statutory form for the Russian
Soviet Republic by the Act on Marriage, Family and Guardianship, a
brainchild of A. Goikbarg. Neither the entry into marriage nor its disso-
38. Id. at 34.
39. A. Goikbarg, who initiated a great many of the 1926 family law provisions, emphasized "a
trend toward the factual abolition of marriage" and S. Wolfson explained in 1929 that Socialism puts
an end to the family." See GUINS, SOVIET LAW AND SovIET SociETY, 428, note 17 (1954).
40. RODHE, supra note 22, at 78.
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lution required any legal manifestation worth mentioning. Nor did they
entail any particularly burdening legal consequences for the parties. The
Law had paid tribute to theory.4 1
X. CLOSING REMARKS
These testimonies as to what Marxism means when made into Law in
Force stem from the Soviet Union. Looking for the evidence there comes
naturally. Kremlin rulers always claimed that the social-economic and
political organization of the Soviet state was based on Marxist principles.
This was an axiom. Within and outside of the Soviet Union this axiom
provided Marxists with a quasi-religious certainty regarding their percep-
tion of the world. In today's world of television and mass charter traffic,
Soviet society clearly displays few of the good qualities predicted of the
post-revolutionary Marxist society. Many Later Marxists therefore tend
to coldshoulder the Soviet Union.
But for lawyers, the main point does not concern these qualities.
Rather it concerns issues of predictability. We in the West are easily
given to ethnocentricity which identifies much of our culture with the
rule of law. In fact, lawyers tend to be proud of that identification. The
identification brings along a great many inhibitions. Things cannot be
done because they are irreconcilable with the rule of law (or law is the
science of inefficiency, to use a perceptive book-title). The Marxists har-
bor no such identification, and this makes them, in one way, completely
unpredictable when dealing with a legal system. In another way, how-
ever, they too are predictable but only if one uses their own body of
teachings to set a framework for what can be done and what is to be
expected. Using examples to show how laws, statutes, and practices de-
velop within such a framework opens up this world to our insight. It
may help lawyers to understand how the same people can organize geno-
cide on the scale of the Nazis (not to mention earlier generations of rulers
hiding in the darkness of history) and yet believe in the arrival of the
41. A.E. Rodhe, Sovjet-ryskfamiljer dtt SVENSK JURISTTIDNING 398 (1928). Compare Jacob
Sundberg, Recent Changes in Swedish Family Law: Experiment Repeated 23 AMERICAN JOURNAL
OF COMPARATIVE LAW 34-49 (1975).
Recall that in 1924, the Soviet Union adopted its second Constitution which regulated more
closely the separation of powers between the Union and the republics of the Union. Thus, while the
first general decree that was promulgated by the new Soviet regime concerned the making and the
dissolution of marriage (1917), family regulation belonged after 1924 to the union republics, most
Important among them the RSFSR.
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Utopian Socialist Man who does everything good simply because he is
Socialist Man. Marxists are certainly difficult clients but even difficult
clients must be handled.
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